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Abstract  
Spare part availability is crucial to restoring inoperative platforms to the working state. Platforms failing during 
operation undergo corrective maintenance to replace failed components with spares. To reduce the frequency of 
this unplanned, corrective maintenance, platforms are inspected periodically and degraded components 
preventively replaced. Maintenance delays occur when spares are unavailable but cannibalisation can reduce these 
delays by allowing working components to be removed from inoperative platforms and used to restore other 
inoperative platforms. Fleets can be deployed across multiple bases that are served by one or more depots. Failed 
components that cannot be repaired at a base are sent to a depot for repair, along with associated requests for 
spares, which are satisfied by depot inventories. 
The management of fleet corrective and preventive maintenance, cannibalisation, spare inventories, provision of 
spares to bases and depots, and response of the depot to spare requests is a complex problem for fleet maintenance 
managers and critical to ensuring acceptable fleet performance. This paper presents a novel hierarchical coloured 
Petri net (HCPN) model of a fleet spare inventory system, which accounts for these issues alongside fleet 
deployment and mission-oriented operation. The application of the model is demonstrated using case studies of 
two example fleets.  
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 Introduction  
Spare part supply is crucial to ensuring that non-mission capable (NMC) platforms can be maintained as required 
in order to meet fleet operational requirements. Critical component failures during operation lead platforms to be 
immediately removed from service for corrective maintenance to replace failed components by spares. Spare part 
unavailability can lead to mission cancellations, unwanted platform downtime and their associated costs but might 
be unavoidable, particularly if the cost of spares is high and maintenance budgets limited. It is therefore difficult 
for fleet managers to determine spare part inventory levels that maintain fleet performance at an acceptable cost. 
Critical component failures on platforms can lead not only to unacceptable downtime or mission cancellations, but 
also to potentially catastrophic loss of platforms. Therefore, fleet maintenance crews perform preventive 
maintenance, periodically inspecting mission capable (MC) platforms and replacing any components that have 
degraded to an unacceptable condition. This condition-based maintenance (CBM) places new demands on spare 
supply; the platform inspection interval can adversely impact spare inventories and fleet performance if not 
properly determined. Frequent inspections may allow for quick identification and replacement of degraded 
components but this may place undue strain on the spare part inventory and negatively impact fleet performance. 
By contrast, less frequent inspections may allow greater fleet performance but may increase the risk of component 
degradation between inspections leading to failures and increasing demand for corrective maintenance. When a 
platform fails and becomes NMC, an opportunity arises to bring forward its next scheduled preventive inspection 
to be performed alongside the required corrective maintenance. This opportunistic maintenance can help to reduce 
platform downtime and interruptions to the fleet operation schedule. 
Fleet maintenance is often organised into three levels: organisation (O-), intermediate (I-) and depot (D-) level. 
NMC platforms are maintained at O-level, where failed components are replaced by spares or cannibalisation. 
Cannibalisation involves removing serviceable parts from a NMC platform and using them to repair other NMC 
platforms in the fleet when the required spares are unavailable. It can maintain fleet performance and reduce spare 
part demands by allowing the consolidation of spare shortages into a small number of NMC platforms. In some 
military organisations, cannibalisation is used as a regular supply method to reduce the maintenance turnaround 
for NMC platforms when spares are unavailable. For example, from 1996 to 2001, over 850000 cannibalisations 
are reported to have been performed in the U.S. Air Force and Navy [1].  
Fleets may be deployed in multiple bases that are served by one or more depots. Bases and depots can have their 
own spare inventories and bases can have their own O-level and I-level maintenance organisations. Removed, 
failed components are sent for repair at I-level with any that are non-repairable at this I-level sent on to D-level 
for further repair. As a component that cannot be repaired at I-level is sent from a base to the depot for repair, a 
spare request from the base is also placed at the depot, which responds by sending back a spare of the required 
type. Once repaired, components are kept in stock at the depot and used to satisfy base spare requests. Operational 
requirements and sub-fleet (platforms deployed at a base) sizes may vary across bases so spares provision to bases 
and depots and the response discipline of depot spare inventories to conflicting base spare requests are important 
management problems in fleet spare inventory control. 
The literature contains a number of fleet spare inventory management models. The most commonly used is the 
Multi-Echelon Technique for Recoverable Item Control (METRIC) model [2], an analytical model designed to 
optimise spare stock levels for fleets with a two-echelon supply system (base and depot). Spare demand follows a 
Possion distribution and the model presents a formula for the total spare shortages in the fleet. The MOD-
METRIC model [3] extends METRIC by introducing two-indenture components (line- (LRU) and shop-
replaceable units (SRU)). MOD-METRIC was implemented by the U.S. Air Force to determine F-15 weapon 
system stock levels. The original METRIC model was found to underestimate the expected number of spare 
shortages [4]. The VARI-METRIC model [4] attempts to address this for a two-echelon supply system, using a 
negative binomial distribution to describe base spare shortages. Sherbrooke [5] further extends the VARI-
METRIC model to include two-indenture components. 
Spare demands are often assumed to follow homogeneous Poisson processes in the METRIC models, making 
them independent of the number of operating platforms and the fleet’s operational requirements. This assumption 
may not accurately describe the real demand in aircraft fleets, particularly in theatre. To overcome this, Lau et al. 
[6] build an analytical model to relate demand to the time-varying number of operating platforms for a two-
echelon supply system. The model calculates fleet performance by computing the expected spare shortages and 
operational availability under spare provision scenarios. Wang and Ma [7] present an analytical model to estimate 
the operational availability of a fleet with dynamic missions. Hillestad [8] introduces the analytical Dyna-
METRIC model, which includes time-dependent operational demands, for the U.S. Air Force.  
It is a limitation of these analytical methods that maintenance policies such as preventive maintenance are ignored. 
A simulation modelling approach to spare inventory management allows the analysis of more operation and 
maintenance factors. Dyna-METRIC Version 5 [9] uses Monte Carlo sampling to accurately represent the 
uncertainties in spare demand and repair processes for aircraft fleets during wartime. However, unlike analytical 
models, simulation models cannot be used to directly compute optimal fleet spare provision scenarios. Finding 
optimal spare inventory levels would require a simulation of every possible spare provision scenario. This is 
achievable for finite research spaces that consist of only a relatively small number of scenarios. However, it is 
impractical or impossible if there are a large, potentially infinite, number of scenarios. In this case, metaheuristic 
algorithms such as a Genetic Algorithm (GA) [10-12], Scatter Search [13] and Simulated Annealing [14] can be 
used to find near-optimal scenarios of fleet spare provision based on the simulation models. 
Marseguerra et al. [10] use a GA-based simulation approach to determine initial levels of spare component 
provision for a single manufacturing plant and maximise net profit. This work is extended [11] through the use of 
a multi-objective GA (MOGA) to simultaneously maximise net profit and minimise the total volume of spare 
components. The models in both papers are designed not for a fleet but for a single platform. Considering 
preventive maintenance, Ilgin and Tunali [12] use a single-objective GA to jointly optimise spare part inventories 
and platform periodic maintenance intervals for a fleet of manufacturing machines. Chen et al. [13] use Scatter 
Search to jointly optimise a component age-based preventive maintenance policy and spare provision in a multi-
echelon supply network. Alrabghi et al. [14] study the joint simulation optimisation problem of component 
preventive maintenance and spare provisioning for a single multi-component manufacturing system. 
There is little literature considering cannibalisation in spare inventory management models. The simulation-based 
Dyna-METRIC Version 6 [15] models cannibalisation but not spare inventory optimisation. To evaluate the effect 
of cannibalisation on fleet performance, Ormon and Cassady [16] and Salman et al. [17] build discrete event 
simulation models of fleet cannibalisation processes but the fleet is assumed to be deployed at one base and 
perform non-stop missions. Sheng and Prescott [18] build a HCPN model of a three-level fleet maintenance 
process considering cannibalisation and spares but only a single operational base is modelled. None of these 
simulation models includes preventive maintenance. 
Existing fleet spare inventory models consider only limited aspects of fleet maintenance, rarely including factors 
such as mission-oriented fleet operation, preventive maintenance or cannibalisation, all of which can significantly 
affect demand for spares. Therefore, to support fleet managers in efficiently managing spare inventories, a 
comprehensive fleet spare inventory model is required, which accounts for factors related to fleet operation, 
maintenance and the provision of spares. A novel hierarchical coloured Petri net (HCPN) model is proposed in 
this paper to represent the spare inventory system of fleets with multiple operational bases, mission-oriented 
operation, three-level maintenance, preventive checks, opportunistic maintenance, repair and cannibalisation. The 
model is applied to two fleets, deployed at single and multiple bases, to investigate inventory management 
problems including: the provision of spares to inventories and the depot response to base spare requests. The joint 
optimisation of spare stock levels and the platform inspection interval is also performed using a GA.  
 Petri Nets 
First introduced by Carl Adam Petri, Petri nets (PN) are powerful, graphical and mathematical tools for modelling 
complex, dynamic systems [21]. The reader is referred to [25] for a thorough review but the main concepts are 
introduced here for clarity. A PN is a directed graph with two types of nodes: places, drawn as circles; and 
transitions, drawn as bars, with nodes of different types connected by directed arcs. Places contain a discrete 
number of tokens whose distribution within the PN defines its marking and hence the system state. Transitions 
govern the dynamic behaviour of the PN, changing the system state when they fire. To fire, a transition is first 
enabled, meaning the number of tokens in each of its input places is no less than the weight of the arc linking it to 
the transition. Transitions can be immediate, drawn as solid bars, or timed, drawn as hollow bars. Immediate 
transitions fire as soon as they are enabled and timed transitions fire after a delay has elapsed following their 
becoming enabled. This firing delay can be either fixed or sampled from a known probability distribution. 
Figure 1 shows a PN with an enabled, timed transition, and the marking that results once it fires after a firing 
delay t. Figure 1 also shows an Inhibitor arc, with a circle at its head, which would prevent the transition from 
being enabled if the number of tokens in the associated place were no less than the weight of the associated arc. 
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Figure 1. Timed transition enabling and firing                  
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Figure 2. Conflicting transitions fire with probabilities 
Conflicts can arise as PN become more complex [19]. For example: 
 Two or more transitions with the same delay (maybe immediate) are enabled by the same input place; 
 An enabled timed transition is disabled while waiting for its delay time to pass. 
In the first case, if the number of tokens in the input place exceeds the sum of the weights of all arcs from it, the 
enabled transitions will fire simultaneously. If not, a probability check can be used to resolve the conflict and set 
the firing order [20]. Figure 2 shows two immediate transitions, T1 and T2, enabled by place P1. T1 fires first with 
probability p1 if both T1 and T2 are enabled. As P1 is marked, a uniform random variable p is sampled between 0 
and 1. If p ≤ p1, T1 fires, removing the token from P1 and disabling T2. Otherwise, the firing sequence is reversed. 
The second case can be resolved using ‘aging’ tokens [19], where each token in an input place is assigned a 
‘counter’ initially set to the firing delay of the related transition. The counter represents the remaining time that a 
token will be held by the transition’s input place and decreases continuously while the transition is enabled, a 
process that stops when the transition is disabled. Aging tokens are useful for modelling platform operation 
processes. Using a timed transition to model a component’s failure process allows a token counter to represent the 
component’s remaining working life (time to failure), which decreases while the component is in use but remains 
static when it is not. The timed transition fires when the counter drops to 0, indicating component failure.  
Coloured Petri nets (CPN) [21] extend PN to allow the concise modelling of the behaviour of complex systems 
such as concurrent systems by introducing: 
 token colour: variables representing different data types, such as Boolean, integer or character strings; 
 place colour set: all possible token colours of a specified type within a place; 
 arc expression: the amount of tokens of specific colours that are removed from or added to the place 
linked by the related arc when a transition fires; 
 transition guard: a Boolean expression representing a constraint on the transition enabling policy.  
A CPN transition is enabled only if its input place markings satisfy their associated input arc expressions and its 
guard evaluates to be true. Tokens of different colours can fire in different ways. Figure 3 shows a CPN transition 
being enabled and firing. Each place has colour set, CS = {red, blue}, which holds two colour variables, cs1 and 
cs2. Arc expressions cs1 and cs2 represent one specifically coloured token from CS, while cs1+cs2 represents two 
coloured tokens. The transition guard, cs1=cs2, enables the transition if its input places contain tokens of the same 
colour. If the delay times for the blue and red tokens are t1 and t2 (t1<t2) respectively then the blue tokens switch to 
the output place at time t1 and after a further delay time t2-t1 the red tokens switch to the output place. 
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Figure 3. Transition enabling and firing in an example coloured Petri net  
Hierarchical CPN (HCPN) are CPN that are organised as sets of modules, which can be non-hierarchical CPN or 
HCPN with their own sub-modules. Modules and sub-modules are related by substitution transitions, drawn here 
as rectangular boxes, which represent an abstract view of a sub-module to its parent module. Sub-modules give a 
detailed view of the functions of the related substitution transitions. HCPN bring a number of clear benefits [21]: 
1. For complex systems single non-hierarchical nets can be unmanageable. Modification simplifies model 
amendment since new modules may be easily added and changes limited to only the necessary modules; 
2. CPN modules behave as black boxes, allowing modellers to work at different levels of abstraction while 
disregarding higher or lower levels; 
3. Modules of repeated system features, such as identical platform maintenance processes performed at different 
bases, may be defined once and used repeatedly, avoiding unnecessary module duplication and reducing the 
modelling workload when module changes are needed. A repeatedly-used module is a parameter module, 
with each replication being an independent module instance, each of which has its own marking.  
The HCPN method is selected to model fleet spare inventories since it can provide a graphical, precise and 
concise representation of the operation and maintenance processes of large, complex fleets. Using token colours 
ensures that the size of the model will not increase with the size of the modelled fleet, since any number of 
platforms or components can be represented by an equivalent number of differently-coloured tokens within a 
single place. The HCPN model’s modular structure means it can be easily modified and extended in future if 
further fleet operational or maintenance activities must be considered. 
 HCPN Model of Fleet Spare Inventory System  
In this section an HCPN model of a fleet spare inventory system is presented, accounting for a variety of 
operational and maintenance factors including multiple bases, mission-oriented operation, preventive inspection, 
opportunistic maintenance, repair and cannibalisation. The model is designed for military aircraft fleets, but could 
be applied to other, similar fleets with similar maintenance processes and spare supply systems with little or no 
amendment. Abbreviations used for place names are given in Appendix 2. 
 Fleet Description  
A fleet is assumed to consist of NP identical and independent platforms which are deployed in NB different bases 
and served by a single depot. The fleet is required to perform a number of missions each day. Platforms have two 
states: MC and NMC. Each MC platform is removed from service for preventive inspection after continuously 
performing a fixed number of missions, given for a platform p by NMPC(p), which may differ between bases and 
platforms. Nbi is the number of platforms deployed at base bi (1≤bi≤NB). A platform p at base bi is represented by 
(bi,pi) where pi is the index of the platform at the base and the check state of platform p is (p,wh) where wh 
represents the number of missions it must still perform before its next preventive inspection.  
Each platform in the fleet can be thought of as a system containing a number of different repairable components, 
each of which are assumed to have three states, representing various states of degradation: working, PM due and 
failed. Components in the working state are fully operational and need no maintenance, while failed components 
can no longer perform their designated functions and need immediate replacement. In the PM due state the 
component is still operational but must be preventively replaced to avoid failure. A component’s transition time 
between states follows a known independent distribution. A component c of type ct in platform p is represented 
by (p,ct,a) where a (a0) is its expected working life (in working hours), which is initialised by sampling from a 
known distribution and decreases continuously while component c is operational. A spare of type ct is represented 
by (0,ct,a). 
After performing a fixed number of missions, a MC platform joins the platform check queue (PCQ) where its 
components are inspected to see if any are failed or in the PM due state. If they are, the platform immediately 
joins the PMQ (platform maintenance queue) where its inoperative (failed or PM due) components are replaced 
by spares or cannibalisation. Otherwise, the platform successfully passes the check and returns to service. If 
opportunistic maintenance (OM) is allowed, a platform that fails during operation before its next scheduled check 
joins the PCQ where its components are inspected to see if any are in the PM due state. If OM is not allowed, the 
platform immediately joins the PMQ and only its failed components are replaced.  
Each base has its own O- and I-level maintenance organisations. The O-level organisation restores NMC 
platforms to the MC state by replacing their failed components by spares or cannibalisation, which is performed 
when the required spares are unavailable. The maintenance of a NMC platform only begins if resources are 
available to replace all of its failed components. When a NMC platform joins the PMQ, maintenance crews 
remove its failed components and send them to I-level for repair, checking whether full restoration to the MC 
state is possible using existing spare and cannibalisation resources. If not, the platform joins the PWMQ (platform 
waiting maintenance queue) to wait for resources to become available. Otherwise, maintenance crews obtain the 
required parts from stock and cannibalisation before restoring the platform to a MC state. 
Failed components are assumed to be repairable at I-level with a known probability. Components that are non-
repairable at the base are sent to the depot for repair, along with associated requests for spares from the depot, 
which responds based on a one-for-one replenishment policy. If a spare is available from the depot inventory, one 
spare of the required type is transported to the base and the received, failed item stocked in the depot once 
repaired. All components are assumed to be repairable at the depot and both I-level and depot repairs are assumed 
to be perfect, returning failed components to the ‘as good as new’ state so they can be treated as brand new spares. 
 HCPN Model Hierarchy  
Figure 4 shows the HCPN model, which consists of 21 modules, organised into 6 levels. Modules in the first two 
levels provide the main interfaces to model users, who can study their own fleets by setting numbers of bases and 
depots in the master module; base sub-fleet parameters including operational requirements, sub-fleet size, 
platform structure, cannibalisation policy, preventive inspection interval and spare stock levels in the base module; 
and depot spare inventories in the depot module. The model outputs to the base module the data needed for the 
calculation of fleet performance measures, which can be used by fleet managers to inform spare inventory related 
decisions. Tables 1 and 2 define the colour sets and colour variables applied in these modules. 
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Figure 4. Model hierarchy 
Table 1. Colour sets 
Colour set Colours  Meaning 
BI {1, ..., B} Base index 
PI {1, .., NP} Platform index 
P {(bi, pi)} Platform 
CT {1,2,…,NC} Component type 
PCS {(p, wh)} Platform check state 
C {(p, ct, a)} Components: a≥0 is the expected working life of a component; p=0 signifies a spare component. 
CRD 
{(c, c1)} 
∀c, c1∊C, c(ct)=c1(ct), 
c(p)0 and c(p)c1(p) 
Component replacement decision: it is decided to replace the failed component c in platform c(p) by 
component c1. c1(p)=0 means c will be replaced by a new spare component. c1(p)0 means that the 
working component c1 is cannibalised from platform c1(p). 
M {1,2,…} Missions 
PM {(p, m)} ∀p∊P, ∀m∊M Platform 𝑝 is assigned to perform mission m 
AS (bi, c) Spare components assigned to base bi by the depot 
Table 2. Colour variables 
Variable Colour Meaning 
p, p1 P A platform 
c, c1,…, cn C A component 
crd CRD A component replacement decision 
ps PCS The check state of a platform 
ps(p) P Platform with ps(wh) missions to perform before next check 
c(p) P Platform to which component c is fitted 
pm, pm1,…, pmNm PM A platform assignment decision 
pm(p) P A platform which is performing a mission 
m M A mission 
pm(m), pm1(m), 
…, pmNm(m) 
M A mission that is being performed   
c(ct) CT The type of component c 
as AS An assigned spare component 
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Figure 5. Master module  
 
 Master Module 
The master module, shown in Figure 5, provides an abstract view of a fleet spare inventory system with multiple 
operational bases and a single depot. PBSCR models a base spare request made when a failed component is non-
repairable and PDCMQ models the base sending the failed component to the depot. PASC models the depot assigning 
spares to the appropriate bases according to the one-for-one replenishment policy. 
This module specifies the numbers of bases and depots in the modelled fleet, and hence the number of base and 
depot module instances required. If there were more depots, the spare supply relationship would be modelled by 
the exchange of tokens between the associated base and depot module instances through the related place 
instances of PBSCR, PDCMQ and PASC. 
 Base Module  
The base module, shown in Figure 6, models the operations and maintenance performed at a base. It consists of 4 
sub-modules:  
 Operation module: models the operation of platforms that are deployed at a base;  
 Platform module: models platform failures and changes of platform state; 
 Component module: models degradation of multi-state components (working, PM due or failed); 
 Base maintenance module: models corrective and preventive maintenance of NMC platforms and the 
repair at a base of PM due and failed components.  
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Figure 6. Base module 
The operation module outputs platforms starting missions to PPPM, which activates the failure processes of their 
working components (tokens in PCW) in the component module. During operation, the component module outputs 
PM-due and failed components to PCPM and PCF. If the platform module finds that a component failure causes a 
platform failure it moves the failed platform to PPNMC, which triggers the operation module to immediately remove 
the platform from service and send it to the base maintenance module through PPMQ. The operation module uses 
PPCS to monitor the operational state of MC platforms and sends platforms needing preventive checks to the base 
maintenance module through PPCQ.  
NMC platforms are maintained in the base maintenance module where their failed components are replaced by 
spares (tokens in PSCI) or cannibalised components (tokens in PCW). Through PPR, the base maintenance module 
outputs restored platforms to the platform module, which changes their state from NMC to MC, meaning they can 
be assigned to scheduled missions by the operation module again. Once removed, failed components that are 
found to be non-repairable in the base maintenance module go through PDCMQ to the depot for repair, with 
associated spare requests from the base placed in the depot spare inventories through PBSCR. 
 Operation HCPN 
The operation module, shown in Figure 7, models the mission-oriented operation of a base’s platforms through: 
 Mission assignment (MA) sub-module: assigns idle, MC platforms to missions at a base; 
 Mission operation (MO) sub-module: models the detailed operational processes of assigned platforms.  
Tokens in PFMS represent the missions that must be performed by platforms at a base. When a mission is called, 
the MA sub-module assigns MC platforms to perform it if there are sufficient idle, MC platforms (represented by 
tokens in PPOG and PPMC) available by outputting the assigned platforms to the MO sub-module through PPAM. If 
not, it is aborted with a token placed in PMGA by the MA sub-module. 
 
Figure 7. Operation module 
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Figure 8. Mission assignment sub-module 
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Figure 9. Mission operation sub-module 
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Figure 10. Mission operation sub-module under operating-hour 
based platform checks
The MO sub-module models platform performance during mission operation. If a platform becomes NMC during 
a mission (PPNMC is marked), a mission air abort event occurs and a token is output to PMAA. The NMC platform is 
immediately taken out of service and moved to PPMQ, the platform maintenance queue. Simultaneously, a token is 
created in PE if cannibalisation is allowed at the base (PCAA is marked), since the NMC platform brings new 
cannibalisation resources. A MC platform is preventively checked following the completion of a set number of 
missions, with the MO sub-module moving it to PPCQ, the platform check queue. If OM is allowed (PAOM is 
marked), instead of PPMQ, NMC platforms are added to PPCQ where their PM-due components are replaced 
alongside the failed components.  
Figure 8 shows the MA sub-module. TFMS sets the scheduled mission start times given by the firing delays of 
tokens in PFMS and adds tokens representing mission m to PMUA. TFMA assigns MC platforms to the scheduled 
mission, where Nm is the number of MC platforms required by mission m. If there are more than Nm idle, MC 
platforms when mission m is called, the fleet manager may apply a selection discipline in order to select Nm 
platforms. After Nm platforms have been assigned to mission m by TFMA, TFMA is inhibited and TMS is enabled, 
immediately moving the token with colour m from PMUA to PMS, starting mission m. A mission must often start 
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within a certain time of being scheduled and may be cancelled if insufficient platforms become available in this 
time. If this happens, TMGA moves the token from PMUS to PMGA, indicating a mission ground abort event. TCMAP 
then returns all platforms pre-assigned to the aborted mission to PPOG (the idle state) to await future missions. 
Figure 9 shows the MO sub-module. When mission m starts (a token with colour m marks PMS), transition TPSPM 
immediately moves the platforms assigned to the mission from PPAM to PPPM, hence enabling TPPM, which assigns 
a delay time representing the platforms’ mission operation times to each token in PPPM; this time may be fixed or 
randomly sampled from a distribution. 
If OM is allowed (PAOM is marked) and platform p becomes NMC during operation (PPNMC marked by a token 
with colour p), TMAA and TMAAC are disabled and TPOM enabled. TPOM removes p from service (removing a token 
with colour pm (pm(p)=p) from PPPM), adds p to the PCQ (creates a token with colour p in PPCQ), records a 
mission air abort (places a token with colour m=pm(m) in PMAA) and refreshes the check state of p (changes the 
colour variable ps(wh) of the related token in PPCS to NMPC(p)). If OM is not allowed (PAOM is unmarked) when a 
platform fails, either TMAA or TMAAC is enabled depending on the cannibalisation policy. If no cannibalisation is 
allowed, TMAA is enabled; this immediately removes the token with colour pm from PPPM, creates tokens with 
colour p=pm(p) in both PPMQ and PPOG and places a token with colour m=pm(m) in PMAA, signifying the 
occurrence of an air abort event during mission m. If cannibalisation is allowed, TMAAC is enabled and fires with 
the same result as TMAA but for the addition of a token to PE after TMAAC fires, signifying that a new cannibalisation 
source is available. 
The check state of platform p is represented by a token with colour ps (ps(p)=p) in PPCS, where ps(wh) represents 
the number of missions, initially NMPC(p), still to be performed by platform p before its next scheduled inspection. 
TPPM updates the check state of platform p by decreasing ps(wh) by 1 every time it fires and absorbs a token with 
colour pm (pm(p)=p) from PPPM. When NMPC(p) missions have been performed without failure (ps(wh) decreases 
to 0), TPNPC is enabled and fires immediately, changing the check state ps(wh) of platform p to NMPC(p) and 
adding p to the PCQ (creating a token with colour p in PPCQ), signifying the inspection of platform p begins.  
Figure 10 shows a variation of the MO sub-module that can be used if platform preventive inspection intervals are 
specified in terms of operating hours rather than number of missions. Differences include the modification of the 
two arcs between TPPM and PPCS to a double-headed arc with expression ps and the changing of check state wh of 
platform p to represent the remaining operating hours before its next check. Using the concept of aging tokens 
introduced in Section 2, the platform check state ps(wh) continuously decreases while token ps in PPCS enables 
TPPM and stops when TPPM is disabled. NTPC(p) is the inspection interval (in number of operating hours) for 
platform p. TPNPC is enabled and fires immediately when the check state (wh) of platform p becomes non-positive 
(PPCS contains a token with colour ps where ps(p)=p and ps(wh)≤0) and p is not performing a mission (PPOG 
contains a token with colour p). After TPNPC fires, the check state wh of platform p is changed to NTPC(p).  
 Platform HCPN 
The platform module, shown in Figure 11, controls platform failures and changes of platform state, modelled 
respectively by the platform failure (PF) and platform state change (PSC) sub-modules. When component failures 
(tokens in PCF) cause a platform failure, the PF sub-module outputs that platform to PPF, activating the PSC sub-
module, which immediately moves the platform from PPMC to PPNMC, changing its state from MC to NMC. After a 
platform is restored, the platform is placed in PPR and the PSC sub-module changes the platform state back to MC.  
A MC platform undergoing a check cannot perform missions and remains NMC in the PSC sub-module until the 
check ends. If the check is passed and no degraded component found, the platform is added to PPPC and reverts to 
the MC state in the PSC sub-module. Otherwise, the platform joins the PMQ to await maintenance.  
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Figure 11. Platform module 
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Figure 12. Example platform fault tree 
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Figure 13. Example platform failure sub-module  
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Figure 14. Platform failure sub-module with multiple failure modes 
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Figure 15. Platform state change sub-module
The PF sub-module models the platform failure process, which can be modelled using a fault tree (FT). The FT 
top event represents platform failure and basic events represent component failures. An example with seven basic 
events, C1-C7, three logic gates, G1-G3, and two intermediate events, I1 and I2, is shown in Figure 12. The PF sub-
module is constructed by converting a FT to a CPN [18]:  
 Basic events are represented by a single place; 
 Each top event and intermediate event is represented by a place; 
 An AND gate is converted to an immediate transition;  
 An OR gate is converted to a number of immediate transitions equal to the number of converted places of 
the gate’s input events. 
Figure 13 shows the CPN that is equivalent to the example FT. A token of colour p is added to PPF when 
component failures make platform p NMC. Restoring platform p to a MC state by marking PPR with a token of 
colour p clears the places relating to the FT intermediate events and top event. Complex platforms, such as aircraft 
and ships, have multiple failure modes, each modelled by a FT with a related CPN. Each of these CPNs becomes 
a substitution transition when constructing the PF sub-module as shown in Figure 14. 
The PSC sub-module, shown in Figure 15, models platform state changes. When platform p fails (a token with 
colour p in PPF), TPNMC immediately moves it from PPMC to PPNMC, meaning that MC platform p becomes NMC 
and needs maintenance. PPR is marked by a token with colour p when the NMC platform p is restored to an 
operational MC state, enabling TPR which immediately removes tokens with colour p from PPR and PPNMC and 
creates a token with colour p in PPMC. TPNMCPC and TPMCPC control changes of platform state in the PCQ. When a 
MC platform p joins the PCQ (both PPCQ and PPMC contain a token with colour p), TPNMCPC immediately moves the 
token with colour p from PPMC to PPNMC. If all components of platform p are found to be in the working state, 
TPMCPC immediately moves the token with colour p from PPNMC to PPMC, indicating that platform p passes the 
check and is MC. 
 Component HCPN 
The component module, shown in Figure 16, models failures of multi-state components, which in this paper are 
defined as those that can exist in a working state, a PM due state or a failed state. 
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Figure 16. Component module  
Each state, working, PM due and failed, is assigned its own place (PCW, PCPM and PCF respectively) and the timed 
transitions TCPM and TCF model the component failure process. The two component failure stages are modelled 
independently. The remaining working life, c(a), of a component c (represented by a token with colour c in PCW) 
is initialised by sampling from a known probability distribution which models the time taken to degrade to the PM 
due state. TCPM fires when c(a) reaches 0, moving token c from PCW to PCPM and resetting c(a) to a time sampled 
from the distribution which models the time taken to degrade from the PM due state to the failed state. 
Though the component module is built for three-state components, it can be used to model the failures of binary-
state components without modification by setting the firing delay of the TCF to 0, meaning the failure times of 
two-state components are represented by the firing delays of TCPM. 
 Base Maintenance HCPN 
The base maintenance module, shown in Figure 17, models detailed O- and I-level maintenance actions that are 
performed at a base including: platform periodic checks, restoration of NMC platforms and repair of failed and 
PM due components. The base maintenance module consists of three sub-modules: O-level maintenance (OLM), 
I-level maintenance (ILM) and base spare inventory control (BSIC), which model corrective and preventive 
maintenance of NMC platforms performed at the base’s O-level maintenance organisation, component repair 
performed at the base’s I-level maintenance organisation, and the management of the base’s spare inventories. 
When a NMC platform is maintained in the OLM sub-module, its failed and PM due components are replaced by 
spares or cannibalised components. Restored platforms appear as tokens in PPR and removed, inoperative 
components initially go through PICMQ to the ILM sub-module, where repairs to the ‘as good as new’ state are 
attempted at I-level. Through PIRC, the ILM sub-module outputs repaired components to the BSIC sub-module 
where they are added to spare inventories. When a component is non-repairable at a base’s I-level, the ILM sub-
module sends it to the depot through PDCMQ and requests a spare of the same type from the depot inventories.  
Spare requests from a base enter through PBSCR into the depot module, which outputs the requested spare 
components from all bases to PASC. The BSIC sub-module identifies and transports spares that are assigned by the 
depot to a specific base, and adds them to the base’s spare inventories as they arrive. The base index is declared 
by the colour of any token in PPCS.  
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𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑄
𝑃𝐶𝐴𝐼
𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐴𝑄
𝑃𝐶𝐴𝐴
𝑃𝐸
𝑃𝑆𝑃𝑅
𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑀𝑄
𝑃𝑃𝑈𝑀
𝑃𝑃𝑅
𝑃𝐶𝐹
𝑃𝐶𝑊
𝑃𝑆𝐶𝐼
𝑃𝐶𝑅𝑃𝑄
𝑃𝐼𝐶𝑀𝑄
𝑃𝐶𝐴𝐷
𝑃𝑆𝐼𝐷
𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐶𝑃𝐶𝐴𝑁
𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑄
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶
𝑃𝐶𝑃𝑀
 
Figure 18. O-level maintenance module
3.4.4.1 O-level Maintenance   
The OLM module, shown in Figure 18, is comprised of 4 sub-modules, shown in Figures 19-22: 
 Platform restoration queuing (PRQ): schedules the restoration of NMC platforms in the PMQ; 
 Cannibalisation inventory control (CAIC): manages available cannibalisation resources; 
 Component replacement decision (CRD): identifies NMC platforms which can be fully restored to the 
MC state by existing spare and cannibalisation resources, and selects spares and cannibalisation resources 
to complete a platform restoration; 
 O-level maintenance action (OLMA): carries out component replacement decisions and preventive 
checks.  
The PRQ sub-module (Figure 19) schedules the maintenance of NMC platforms in the PMQ (tokens in PPMQ). 
Through PSPR, the PRQ sub-module outputs the platform with the highest maintenance priority to the CRD sub-
module (Figure 21), which checks whether it can be fully restored using spares or by cannibalisation. If so, the 
platform moves to PPUM and the necessary components are replaced in the OLMA sub-module according to the 
spare installation and cannibalisation decisions (represented by tokens in PSLID and PLCAD) from the CRD sub-
module. The selected spares and cannibalised components are identified in PSSC and PCCAQ. The OLMA sub-
module sends removed, failed components to PICMQ for I-level repair and outputs the platform to PPR once all the 
necessary components have been replaced. Otherwise, if there are insufficient resources to fully restore the 
platform, the CRD sub-module puts it in PPWMQ (platform waiting maintenance queue) to wait until resources are 
available. The PRQ sub-module checks all platforms in the PMQ for the possibility of full restoration in the CRD 
sub-module.  
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Figure 19. Platform restoration queuing sub-module  
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Figure 20. Cannibalisation inventory control sub-module
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Figure 21. Component replacement decision sub-module  
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Figure 22. O-level maintenance action sub-module                       
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Figure 23. Platform preventive check sub-module
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Figure 24. Set component replacement queue sub-module 
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Figure 25. Component replacement sub-module 
The CAIC sub-module (Figure 20) manages the available cannibalisation resources, which are the working 
components of NMC platforms. If cannibalisation is allowed (PCAA is marked), a platform’s cannibalisation 
candidates (tokens in PCW) are added to the cannibalisation inventory (PCAI) as it joins the PMQ and removed 
when restoration of the platform begins. MC Platforms in the platform check queue (PPCQ) are checked in the 
OLMA sub-module. If failed or PM due components are found in a platform it is added to PPMQ (platform 
maintenance queue). Otherwise, the platform passes the check and an associated token is placed in PPPC.  
The OLMA module (Figure 22), modelling the maintenance actions performed at a base’s O-level maintenance 
organisation, comprises three sub-modules: platform preventive check (PPC), set component replacement queue 
(SCRQ) and component replacement (CR). When a platform joins a base’s PCQ (PPCQ), the PPC sub-module 
(Figure 23) is activated and checks the platform for failed or PM due components. If it fails the check and needs 
maintenance, the platform is output to PPFC. Otherwise, it passes and a token representing it is placed in PPPC.  
When a platform fails a periodic check, the SCRQ sub-module (Figure 24) adds its PM due components (if any 
exist) to the component removal (PCRQ) and component replacement queues (PCRPQ). After replacement tasks are 
identified for its PM due components, the platform joins the PMQ, which can be viewed as a replenishment of the 
cannibalisation resources. Hence, when a platform fails a check and joins the PMQ, a token is placed in PE to 
enable the restoration check of platforms in the PWMQ. Failed components (tokens in PCF) are identified in PCRQ 
and PCRPQ by the SCRQ sub-module once their parent platform enters the PMQ. 
The CR sub-module (Figure 25) performs component replacement tasks. Once the CRD sub-module has placed 
component spare and cannibalisation replacement decisions in PSID and PCAD, the selected spares and cannibalised 
components are obtained from the inventory and their source platforms and installed in the destination platform 
after inoperative components have been removed. These inoperative components are sent to the base’s I-level 
maintenance organisation for repair through PICMQ. When all inoperative components have been replaced, the 
platform undergoing maintenance (a token in PPUM) is restored and output to PPR by the CR sub-module.  
3.4.4.2 I-level Maintenance 
The ILM sub-module, shown in Figure 26, models component repair at a base’s I-level maintenance organisation. 
After arriving at I-level, a failed component is first checked to see whether repair is possible. pc(ct) is the 
probability that component c is possible at I-level. When a token of colour c is added to PICMQ (failed component c 
arrives at I-level), a variable r is randomly sampled from the range 0 to 1. If r<pc(ct), TSICRQ moves the token from 
PICMQ to PIFCRQ, indicating the component is repairable at I-level. Otherwise, TSDCRQ moves the token from PICMQ 
to PFCTD and places a token representing an associated spare request in PBSCR. Then TTID adds the component to the 
depot component maintenance queue (PDCMQ). 
TIRFC, whose associated firing delays represent component repair times, governs component repair at I-level, 
outputting tokens with colour (0,ct,a) to PIRC, where a is randomly sampled from a probability distribution relating 
to the component failure time. If there is no I-level maintenance, pc, the I-level repair probability, is set to 0 for all 
components, meaning all inoperative components go directly to the depot after removal at O-level. Similarly, if 
there is no D-level maintenance, pc is set to 1 for all components, meaning all component repair is at I-level. 
𝑐 
𝑃𝐼𝐶𝑀𝑄
𝑐 ∗ 𝑝𝑐(𝑐𝑡 )  
𝑇𝑆𝐼𝐶𝑅𝑄
𝑇𝑆𝐷𝐶𝑅𝑄
𝑐 ∗ (1 − 𝑝𝑐(𝑐𝑡 )) 
𝑐  
𝑃𝐼𝐹𝐶𝑅𝑄
𝑃𝐹𝐶𝑇𝐷
𝑃𝐼𝑅𝐶  
𝑐 (0, 𝑐(𝑐𝑡), 𝑎)
𝑇𝐼𝑅𝐹𝐶
𝑃𝐷𝐶𝑀𝑄  𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐷  
𝑐 𝑐 
𝑃𝐵𝑆𝐶𝑅
𝑐 
     
 Figure 26. I-level maintenance sub-module  
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Figure 27. Base spare inventory control sub-module 
3.4.4.3 Base Spare Inventory Control  
The BSIC module, shown in Figure 27, identifies and transports base spare inventory replenishments, which are 
spare components assigned to a specific base by the depot and components repaired at the base’s I-level. TIBASC 
identifies spare requests from base bi, which can be satisfied by depot inventories, placing assigned spares in 
PASCTB. TIBASC is enabled when tokens with colour as and ps mark PASC and PPCS respectively and satisfy 
ps(p)(bi)=as(bi), in which case it immediately removes the token with colour as from PASC and creates a token 
with colour c=as(c) in PASCTB. This enables TTDO, which moves the token from PASCTB to PSCI after a delay 
representing the transportation time from the depot to base bi. Components repaired at I-level (tokens in PIRC) are 
transported to the associated inventory by TTIO. PE is marked when TTDO or TTIO fire, indicating that new spares are 
available and the OLM module can therefore attempt to restore platforms in the PWMQ.  
 Depot Module 
The depot module, shown in Figure 28, models the repair of inoperative components brought from bases and the 
response of depot inventories to base spare requests. Once requested, if a spare component of the required type is 
available in the depot stock, it is sent to the base through PASC. Otherwise, the spare request is backordered until 
the depot inventory is restocked by repaired components. TDRC governs the depot repair of inoperative components 
from bases and outputs the perfectly repaired components to the depot spare inventories (PDSCI). Spare requests 
arriving from bases (PBSCR is marked) activate TASC, which satisfies the base requests with available spares. 
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Figure 28. Depot module 
 Model Operation  
Before using the HCPN model to investigate fleet spare inventory management problems, fleet operation and 
maintenance parameters must first be input by setting the initial marking, arc expressions and transition firing 
delays. For instance, cannibalisation policy is governed by PCAA in the base module (Figure 6). PCAA is unmarked 
if cannibalisation is not used at a base and marked otherwise. 
The detailed model initialisation input parameters and associated places, transitions and arcs are listed in Table 3. 
In addition, platform restoration queuing and selection of cannibalisation resources are respectively represented 
by TSP in the PRQ sub-module (Figure 19) and TPCAD in the CRD sub-module (Figure 21), which switch tokens 
from their input places in an order determined by a selection discipline. The disciplines used to assign MC 
platforms to scheduled missions and to determine how depot spare inventories respond to spare requests from 
different bases are respectively governed by TFMA in the MA sub-module (Figure 8) and TASC in the depot module 
(Figure 28). The numbers of bases and depots specify the numbers of instances of base and depot modules in the 
master module and spare supply relationships are modelled by how these instances transfer tokens. 
Table 3. Input parameters represented by places, transitions and arcs 
Place/transitions/arcs Module Input parameters represented by initial place marking/transition firing delays/arc expressions  
PFMS Base The total number of required missions at a base 
PPMC Base The total number and indices of platforms at a base 
PCW Base The total number and indices of components in platforms at a base  
PCAA Base The cannibalisation policy at a base 
PSCI Base The number of spares of each component type at a base 
PDSCI Depot The number of spares of each component type at a depot 
PAOM Base The opportunistic policy at a base 
TFMS MA The start time of each mission  
TMGA MA The assignment time window of each mission  
TPPM MO The length of each mission  
TCF Component Component failure time  
TCPM Component Component PM due time  
TRFC OLMA Removal time of failed and PM due components  
TRWC OLMA Removal time of cannibalised components  
TISC OLMA Installation time of spare components 
TIWC OLMA Installation time of cannibalised components 
TIRC ILM Component repair time at I-level  
TDRC Depot Component repair time at a depot  
TTOI OLMA The transportation time from O-level to I-level  
TTID ILM The transportation time from a base to a depot 
TTIO BSIC The transportation time from I-level to O-level  
TTDO BSIC  The transportation time from a depot to a base 
TPC PPC The time to perform a platform inspection  
The inhibitor arc from 
PPAM to TFMA 
MA The required number of MC platforms to perform a scheduled mission 
The input arc from PICMQ  
to TSICRQ 
ILM The I-level repair probability of failed components 
The output arc from 
TPNPC to PPCS 
MO The platform inspection interval  
Once all input parameters are initialised, the HCPN model can be used as a framework for a Monte Carlo 
simulation analysis of the modelled fleet’s performance. Monte Carlo simulation uses repeated random sampling 
and statistical analysis to obtain the required fleet performance [22]. Bespoke C# software was developed to 
encode the simulation of the HCPN model. The software takes in the required fleet parameters in Excel-file 
format and uses them to initialise the model and set the structure of the platform module within each module 
instance, before producing the required module instances and connecting them to produce the complete net. A 
specified number of simulations are performed with the marking during simulations used to gather information for 
the calculation of the following performance measures:  
 Mission capable rate (MCR): proportion of time that platforms in the fleet are capable of performing 
missions in a given time interval; 
 Mission abort rate (MAR): proportion of missions that are not performed successfully due to platform 
failures and cancelled due to a lack of MC platforms;  
 Mission air abort rate (MAAR): proportion of missions aborted due to platform failures; 
 Mission ground abort rate (MGAR): proportion of missions cancelled because insufficient MC platforms 
are available;  
 Cannibalisation rate (CAR): number of cannibalisations performed per 100 missions completed by a fleet. 
Table 4 lists the information needed to calculate these performance measures and the places where this 
information is collected. The developed software outputs related statistics to Excel files for analysis. The 
confidence level of the simulation results depends on the number of simulations performed, with convergence of 
results coming with more simulations [23]. In this paper, convergence is considered to occur when further 
simulations change the results by less than 1%, which generally happened after around 100 simulations. 
Table 4. Information for calculating fleet performance measures  
Indicator Information   Places Module   
CAR Number of cannibalisations performed   PCAN Base Number of missions performed  PME MO 
MAR, 
MGAR, 
MAAR 
Number of missions required PFMS Base 
Number of mission ground aborts PMGA Base 
Number of mission air aborts  PMAA Base 
MCR Total MC hours of each platform  PPMC Base 
 Model Capability  
The proposed HCPN models can concisely model operation and maintenance systems of complex fleets and 
provide an ideal framework for Monte Carlo simulation, hence delivering a tool for fleet managers to: 
 Estimate and predict fleet performance. Given all the fleet characteristics including fleet deployment, 
operational requirements at different bases, platform and component failure characteristics, time relating to 
maintenance actions, available maintenance resources and the applied maintenance policies, the HCPN 
models can be used to obtain the fleet performance measures that concern fleet managers;  
 Manage the spare inventory system. Due to the flexibility of the HCPN models, different spare provision 
scenarios and inventory control policies such as the depot response policies to conflicting base spare requests 
and base stocking rules can be easily compared based on their effects on fleet performance, which can be used 
to direct the provision and management of spare inventories.  
 Select maintenance strategies. The HCPN modules allow fleet managers to study and compare the effects of 
different maintenance policies such as cannibalisation, opportunistic maintenance and different preventive 
check intervals on fleet performance, and address their strengths and weaknesses without modification of the 
whole models. This feature ensures that the selection of maintenance policies could be easily done by fleet 
managers according to their objectives of maintenance management.  
 Optimise fleet maintenance system performance. Through employing intelligent optimisation algorithms, 
maintenance strategy and spare provision can be jointly optimised, which can support fleet managers in 
selecting the most effective way to improve and optimise the fleet maintenance performance.  
 Direct the fleet maintenance system design. Since the HCPN model can represent different fleet maintenance 
systems that vary according to the number of depots, base maintenance capability and distance between 
depots and base maintenance shops, it can help fleet managers determine the organisation and locations of the 
available maintenance facilities through the comparisons of fleet performance under different scenarios.  
 Model Application  
To demonstrate how the HCPN model can be used to assist with spare inventory management, it is first applied to 
an example fleet with a single base. The effect of spares on fleet performance and the impact of platform 
inspection intervals on spare inventory performance are studied. The joint optimisation of spare stock levels and 
platform inspection intervals are also studied using a GA to solve the optimisation problem. A further example 
fleet with two operational bases is studied to demonstrate the use of the HCPN model in fleet spare inventory 
management for fleets with multiple operational bases. Two specific problems are studied: the allocation of spares 
to bases and the depot, and depot spare inventory response discipline when conflicting base spare requests arise. 
 Application to a Fleet with a Single Base 
The fleet consists of 20 identical, independent platforms, each comprising 10 three-state components connected in 
series. There are sufficient maintenance crews to complete all required maintenance at any time. Table 5 shows 
the distributions governing component state changes, removal/installation times, repair times and spare costs. The 
fleet must perform 18 identical missions per day for one year. The duration of each mission in hours is assumed to 
follow a Uniform (16,24) distribution. Platform inspection duration (hours) follows a Triangle (4,6,7) distribution. 
The time taken in hours to transport components between the base’s O- and I-level maintenance organisations and 
between the base and depot follow Triangle (0.1,0.15,0.25) and Triangle (20,22,24) distributions respectively. 
 Effects of Cannibalisation and Opportunistic Maintenance (OM) 
In order to determine appropriate cannibalisation and OM policies for the fleet, their effects on fleet performance 
are first investigated through four scenarios, which differ according to the applied maintenance polices:  
 Scenario 1: no cannibalisation, no OM 
 Scenario 2: with cannibalisation, no OM 
 Scenario 3: no cannibalisation, with OM 
 Scenario 4: with cannibalisation, with OM 
Table 5. Example fleet parameters 
Compon
ent 
PM 
time 
Failure 
time 
Remove time 
(hour) 
Repair time 
(hour) 
Install time 
(hour) 
Base  
repair rate 
Spare 
price 
Spare holding 
cost 
1 Weibull (β=1.4, η =1500) 
Weibull 
(β=1.4, η =600) 
Uniform 
 (4.5,5.5) 
Triangle 
(225,230,240) 
Uniform 
 (3.5,5) 0.8 92000 1300 
2 Weibull (β=1.8, η =1700) 
Weibull 
(β=1.8, η =450) 
Uniform 
(5.5,6.5) 
Uniform 
(150,160) 
Uniform 
(6,8) 0.95 100000 1600 
3 Weibull (β=1.7, η =2000) 
Weibull 
(β=1.7, η =500) 
Triangle 
(4,5,6) 
Uniform 
(170,190) 
Triangle 
 (6,6.5,7) 0.9 44000 760 
4 Normal (µ=1900, σ=18) 
Normal 
(µ=350, σ=18) 
Uniform 
(3.8,4.5) 
Triangle 
(150,156,160) 
Uniform 
(3.8,4.5) 0.75 70000 1400 
5 Weibull (β=1.5, η =1850) 
Weibull 
(β=1.5, η =750) 
Triangle 
(3.5,4.5,6) 
Uniform 
(195,230) 
Triangle 
(3,4,4.5) 0.85 120000 1040 
6 Weibull (β=1.3, η=2300) 
Weibull 
(β=1.3, η=230) 
Triangle 
(3,4,5) 
Triangle 
 (230,240,250) 
Uniform 
(4,6) 0.85 50000 1000 
7 Weibull (β=1.3, η=2300) 
Weibull 
(β=1.3, η=230) 
Triangle 
(3,4,5) 
Triangle 
 (230,240,250) 
Uniform 
(4,6) 0.9 50000 1000 
8 Lognormal (µ=7.6, σ=0.8) 
Lognormal, 
(µ=6.2, σ=0.8) 
Uniform 
 (2.8,4.2) 
Triangle 
(170,178,190) 
Uniform 
(3.6,4) 0.9 80000 800 
9 Weibull (β=1.6, η =1950) 
Weibull 
(β=1.6, η =360) 
Triangle 
(3,4,4.5) 
Uniform 
(180,210) 
Triangle 
(3,3.5,4.5) 0.8 86000 1080 
10 Weibull (β=1.9, η =1780) 
Weibull 
(β=1.9, η =450) 
Triangle 
(3.5,4.5,6) 
Triangle 
(195,210,230) 
Triangle 
(3,4,4.5) 0.75 40000 600 
None of the scenarios allow platform preventive checks or spares. A random discipline is applied to platform 
restoration and cannibalisation queuing. Convergence of results for all performance indicators was observed by 
100 simulations. This was the case for all scenarios analysed in this paper but to guarantee accuracy of results, 
200 simulations are performed in all cases. Table 6 summarises fleet performance in the four scenarios. The 
results show that, for this fleet: 
1. Allowing only cannibalisation increases MCR and reduces MAR (compare values between scenarios 2 
and 1). Note the reduction in MAR is due to a huge reduction in MGAR, however MAAR increases and 
6.23 cannibalisations are required every 100 missions. 
2. Allowing only OM also increases MCR and reduces MAR (compare scenarios 3 and 1). In contrast to 
when performing only cannibalisation (scenario 2), the reduction in MAR is due not just to reduced 
MGAR but also to reduced MAAR, although more missions are performed if OM is applied. This 
happens because PM due components in NMC platforms are replaced alongside failed components under 
OM, helping to reduce the number of platform failures experienced during operation. 
3. Allowing both OM and cannibalisation (scenario 4) gives the best fleet performance in terms of MCR, 
MGAR and MAR. Using OM in addition to cannibalisation reduces MAAR and CAR (compare scenarios 
2 and 4). This may be due to OM reducing the number of platform failures, resulting in fewer mission air 
aborts, limiting available cannibalisation resources and the demand for cannibalisation. 
Therefore, for this fleet, these results suggest that it may be better to use both cannibalisation and OM.  
Table 6. Effects of cannibalisation and opportunistic maintenance on fleet performance 
Fleet Performance Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario3 Scenario 4 
MCR 
Average 62.5% 81.4% 76.1% 83.0% 
Maximum simulated   64.2% 82.6% 77.6% 84.3% 
Minimum simulated 60.4% 80.2% 74.1% 81.6% 
Standard deviation 0.68% 0.50% 0.64% 0.48% 
MAR 
Average 35.6% 16.3% 18.7% 11.5% 
Maximum simulated   38.3% 18.1% 21.2% 12.9% 
Minimum simulated 33.5% 14.8% 17.2% 10.2% 
Standard deviation 0.80% 0.60% 0.76% 0.51% 
MGAR 
Average 30.7% 9.5% 15.7% 8.3% 
Maximum simulated   33.2% 11.1% 18.1% 9.7% 
Minimum simulated 28.8% 8.1% 14.3% 7.0% 
Standard deviation 0.73% 0.56% 0.69% 0.48% 
MAAR 
Average 4.9% 6.8% 3.0% 3.2% 
Maximum simulated   5.1% 7.3% 3.2% 3.5% 
Minimum simulated 4.7% 6.3% 2.7% 2.9% 
Standard deviation 0.08% 0.18% 0.09% 0.10% 
CAR 
Average 0 6.23 0 4.54 
Maximum simulated   0 7.47  0 5.41  
Minimum simulated 0 4.87  0 3.46  
Standard deviation 0 0.48  0 0.33 
 Effect of Spares  
To investigate the effect of spares on fleet performance and the effect of platform inspection intervals on spare 
inventories, 10 scenarios, each assuming a fixed number of spares (ranging from 1 to 10) for each type of 
component are studied under three platform inspection scenarios, which differ according to the inspection interval: 
5 missions, 25 missions, and infinite (i.e. no preventive inspection). Both cannibalisation and OM are allowed and 
all spares are stocked at the base.  
Figures 29-31 summarise average fleet performance under the three platform inspection scenarios. The results 
show that, for this fleet, increasing the provided number of spares: 
1. Can increase MCR and reduce MGAR (see Figure 29). However, the additional benefit decreases with 
increasing number of spares. The flattening of these rates happens because platform NMC time has three 
elements: preventive inspection time, time waiting for available spare or cannibalised resources, and 
actual restoration time; of these elements, increasing the number of spares can only reduce waiting time. 
2. Can reduce CAR (see Figure 30), with virtually no cannibalisations performed if 6 or more spares are 
stocked for each component type no matter the platform inspection policy. This is expected since 
cannibalisations will not be required when sufficient spares are available. 
3. May have no significant impact on MAAR (see Figure 31). This is particularly true for shorter inspection 
intervals – observe how average MAAR is unchanged no matter how many spares are stocked for an 
inspection interval of 5 missions with little change also seen in the other scenarios. This may be because 
critical operational requirements require most platforms in the fleet to perform missions daily (18 
missions per day for a fleet of 20 platforms), resulting in a similar number of platform failures under a 
specified inspection policy as the increase in the spare inventories.  
 
  Figure 29. Change of mission capable rate and mission ground abort rate with number of spares 
 
 
Figure 30.Change of cannibalisation rate with number of spares 
 
Figure 31. Change of mission air abort rate with number of spares
The results also show that, for this fleet: 
1. If the number of spares is unchanged, reducing the inspection interval can decrease MCR (see Figure 29). 
The MCR drops from 97.3% to 89.5% when 10 spares are provided and the inspection interval is reduced 
from 25 to 5 missions. This shows that a poorly-specified inspection interval could negatively impact 
MCR even when sufficient spares are provided. 
2. Providing more spares will not necessarily increase the MCR (see Figure 29). The MCR is higher when 
stocking 2 spares and the inspection interval is 25 missions than it is when stocking 10 spares and the 
inspection interval is 5 missions. 
  Joint Optimisation of Platform Inspection Interval and Spare Inventories 
The results in the previous section demonstrate the complicated relationship between spare inventories and 
inspection intervals but cost is also a major factor. Repairable spares can be expensive, meaning inventories often 
cannot stock enough of them due to budget constraints. Mission cancellations and air aborts can also induce huge 
penalty costs. Therefore, it is important to jointly determine spare inventory stocks and platform inspection 
intervals to minimise the total cost of spares and penalties due to mission aborts.  
4.1.3.1 Problem Formulation  
The objective of this optimisation problem is to minimise the total cost of spares and penalties due to platform 
failures and mission ground aborts.  
The cost of spares includes purchase and holding costs. Let sj, PCj, HCj and HTj respectively represent the initial 
amount, the price per unit, the holding price per hour and the total hours held in the inventory of the purchased 
spare of type j (1≤j≤10). HTj is calculated during HCPN model simulations. The spare cost, SC, is given by: 
SC = ∑10j=1 (sj×PCj + HCj×HTj)                                                        (1) 
The cumulative number of mission air aborts (platform failures), NMAA, and total ground aborts, NMGA, are obtained 
from the base module (Figure 17) during simulations. The platform failure and mission cancellation costs, FTC 
and MCTC, are given by: 
FTC = NMAA×FC                                                                        (2) 
MCTC = NMGA×MCC                                                                     (3) 
where FC and MCC are the penalty cost per platform failure and per ground abort. The total cost, TC, is therefore: 
TC = ∑10j=1 (sj×PCj+ HCj×HTj) + NMAA×FC + NMGA×MCC                                    (4) 
The decision variables are s1,…,s10, which represent the initial number of spares of each type in the inventory and 
NMPC, the platform inspection interval. Thus, the joint optimisation of the fleet spare inventory and platform 
inspection interval is represented by: 
Objective: Min TC                                                                        (5) 
Subject to: sj ≥ 0, integer, 1 ≤ j ≤ 10                                                        (6) 
NMPC > 0, integer                                                                         (7) 
The penalty costs of air and ground aborts are assumed to be 30000 and 3000 respectively and it is assumed that 
the inspection interval (NMPC) and the number of spares for each component type (sj) are integers which vary 
between 5 and 30 missions and between 0 and 3 spares respectively. This yields over 2.7×108 possible scenarios, 
making it impractical to exhaustively simulate all scenarios in order to find an optimal solution.  
4.1.3.2 Genetic Algorithm  
The Genetic Algorithm (GA) approach is used in this paper to search for an optimal solution due to its capability 
of solving a wide range of optimisation problems with a variety of decision variables. First introduced by Holland 
in 1975, it is a computational technique based on the Darwinian principle of ‘survival-of-the-fittest’ [24]. Rather 
than searching the solution space from a single solution, the search is performed on a population of solutions, each 
of which is assigned a fitness (in this case the TC calculated using the HCPN). The fitter individuals in a 
population are then more likely to be chosen as parents for the next generation, with the GA operators of selection, 
crossover and mutation applied to produce a new population. Since the GA approach is not the emphasis of this 
research it is not discussed in detail here. The reader is instead referred to [10-12] and [24] although this is just a 
small subset of the available literature. The use of the GA demonstrates how fleet maintenance decision making 
can be supported by the HCPN model in conjunction with an optimisation technique. 
4.1.3.3 Problem Solution 
To obtain a satisfactory solution for the considered fleet, 60 generations are produced, each with a population of 
30 individuals. The crossover and mutation rates are set to be 0.9 and 0.05 respectively. An elitism policy is 
applied where the 5 best scenarios in a population directly enter the next generation.  
Figure 32 shows the evolution of minimal and average costs from generation to generation. The solution with the 
lowest total cost of 4222000 is identified in the 32nd generation, and requires (s1,s2,s3,s4,s5,s6,s7,s8,s9,s10) = 
(1,0,0,2,0,0,0,0,0,1) and a platform inspection interval of 8 missions. To demonstrate the efficiency of the GA-
based approach, this optimal scenario is compared to the four boundary scenarios:  
 Scenario 1: min. inspection interval (5 missions), min. number of spares (0 for each type)  
 Scenario 2: min. inspection interval (5), max. number of spares (3) 
 Scenario 3: max. inspection interval (30), min. number of spares (0) 
 Scenario 4: max. inspection interval (30), max. number of spares (3) 
 
Figure 32. Minimal and average cost 
Table 7 summarises the average fleet performance for these four scenarios and the optimal scenario. The optimal 
scenario performs best in terms of cost and seems acceptable in other terms, never providing the worst 
performance for any particular measure.  
Table 7. Boundary scenario and optimisation results 
Fleet performance Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Optimal Scenario 
Average MCR 74.6% 84.5% 82.2% 93.3% 79.1% 
Average MAR 21.0% 11.8% 12.1% 4.8% 15.5% 
Average MGAR 20.8% 11.5% 9.6% 2.1% 15.0% 
Average MAAR 0.2% 0.3% 2.5% 2.7% 0.5% 
Average CAR 7.68 0.61 4.89 0.37 6.42 
Average cost(000) 4576 5014 6832 8008 4222 
 Application to a Fleet with Two Bases  
The application of the HCPN model to fleets with multiple operational bases is demonstrated through the study of 
two inventory management problems: 
1. How to allocate purchased spares to depot and base inventories? 
2. How should the depot respond to conflicting base spare requests? 
An inefficient allocation of spares may lead to their unavailability when required due to being in transit between 
bases and the depot. The depot response discipline might be chosen to either guarantee the performance of a 
specified base or balance the performance of all bases.  
The fleet used to study these problems consists of 55 identical and independent platforms, 2 bases and 1 depot. 
The platforms are identical to those investigated in Section 4.1 as are the mission start time and the time taken to 
inspect a platform. The two bases have different inspection policies and operational requirements, shown in Table 
8. All inoperative components are sent to the depot for repair and the time in hours to transport a component 
between bases and the depot follows a Triangle(20,22,24) distribution. 
Table 8. Fleet parameters 
 
Deployed 
platforms 
Mission requirement 
(missions per day) 
Mission length 
(hours) 
Inspection interval 
(missions without failure) 
Base 1 30 25 Uniform (16,18) 10 
Base 2 25 22 Uniform (14,16) 12 
The following sections illustrate how to apply the HCPN model to these problems through the comparison of 
different scenarios; optimisation could also be performed using a method similar to that presented in Section 
4.1.3. For all scenarios studied, 200 simulations are performed and both OM and cannibalisation are allowed. 
 Spare Allocation 
4 spares are assumed for each component type and these are allocated between the depot and bases as follows: 
 Scenario 1: depot: 4, base 1: 0, base 2: 0 
 Scenario 2: depot: 2, base 1: 1, base 2: 1 
 Scenario 3: depot: 0, base 1: 2, base 2: 2 
The depot responds to base spare requests using a FIFO (first in first out) policy. Table 9 summarises the average 
overall fleet performance, and the performances of the sub-fleets at each of the bases under the three scenarios.  
Table 9. Simulation results under different spare allocation scenarios 
Fleet 
performance 
Scenario 1 
(4, 0, 0) 
Scenario 2 
(2, 1, 1) 
Scenario 3 
(0, 2, 2) 
Fleet Base 1 Base 2 Fleet Base 1 Base 2 Fleet Base 1 Base 2 
Average MCR 83.2% 82.6% 83.8% 83.1% 82.5% 83.9% 82.4% 81.0% 84.1% 
Average MAR 6.2% 5.3% 7.1% 6.2% 5.3% 7.1% 6.8% 6.7% 7.0% 
Average MGAR 5.5% 4.6% 6.5% 5.5% 4.6% 6.5% 6.1% 5.9% 6.4% 
Average MAAR 0.7% 0.7% 0.6% 0.7% 0.7% 0.6% 0.7% 0.7% 0.6% 
Average CAR 5.14 5.59 4.63 5.13 5.56 4.61 4.11 5.04 3.04 
The results suggest that, for sub-fleet 1: 
1. Performance increases as the number of spares in the depot inventory increases, as does CAR. 
2. Stocking all spares at the depot (scenario 1) gives the best MCR and MAR for this sub-fleet but also the 
highest CAR. 
3. By contrast, allocating spares equally between bases (scenario 3) gives the lowest CAR but the worst 
MCR and MAR. 
4. Scenario 2 gives similar MCR, MAR and CAR to those seen when all spares are stocked at the depot 
(scenario 1). 
For sub-fleet 2: 
1. As for sub-fleet 1, CAR decreases as the number of spares allocated to its base inventory increases. 
2. CAR decreases by about one-third if the number of spares of each type at the base increases from 0 to 2. 
3. In contrast to the change in MCR for sub-fleet 1, the MCR for sub-fleet 2 slowly decreases as the depot’s 
share of spares increases.  
For the overall fleet: 
1. The changes in performance across the scenarios mirror those of sub-fleet 1. 
2. Stocking all spares at the depot (scenario 1) gives the best MCR and MAR, but also the highest CAR. 
3. Allocating spares to base inventories (scenarios 2 and 3) lowers the CAR, but can negatively affect fleet 
performance according to other measures. 
The transportation time between bases and the depot is relatively short (about 24 hours) meaning that stocking 
spares at the depot benefits fleet performance since the depot inventories are within reach of both sub-fleets, 
therefore benefiting each base. The fleet is unequally deployed across the two bases, bases have different 
operational requirements and all failed components go to the depot for repair. Allocating more spares to the depot 
could help to maintain the performance of the larger base 1 sub-fleet, which experiences more failures during 
operation, but may be detrimental to the smaller sub-fleet with fewer failures, because the less frequent base 2 
spare requests may be dominated by those from base 1 under the FIFO depot response policy. Considering that 
the negative effect on the base 2 sub-fleet performance is slight when using more depot spares, it may be better to 
stock all spares at depot inventories to maximise fleet MCR and minimise MAR. However, if the objective of the 
spare inventory management is to minimise the use of cannibalisation, it may be better to stock all spares at bases. 
 Depot Response Discipline 
In considering depot response discipline, three new policies are studied in addition to the FIFO policy: 
 Random selection, 
 Base 1 priority, 
 Base 2 priority. 
There are again 4 spares for each component type and the depot stocks them all. Table 10 summarises overall fleet 
and sub-fleet performance under the three policies, with performance under the FIFO policy given in Table 9. 
Table 10. Simulation results under various depot response policies 
Fleet performance Random  Base 1 priority Base 2 priority Fleet Base 1 Base 2 Fleet Base 1 Base 2 Fleet Base 1 Base 2 
Average MCR 83.2% 82.5% 84.0% 82.9% 84.9% 80.5% 82.8% 78.9% 87.6% 
Average MAR 6.1% 5.5% 6.9% 7.0% 4.1% 10.3% 6.7% 9.1% 4.0% 
Average MGAR 5.4% 4.7% 6.3% 6.3% 3.4% 9.7% 6.0% 8.3% 3.3% 
Average MAAR 0.7% 0.8% 0.6% 0.7% 0.8% 0.6% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 
Average CAR 5.16 5.56 4.70 5.01 5.61 4.28 4.85 4.83 4.86 
The results show that: 
1. Of the four polices, random selection gives the best fleet MCR and MAR but also the highest CAR. 
2. Under FIFO, the fleet performs similarly to how it does under random selection. 
3. The priority response policies guarantee the sub-fleet with priority performs best, as expected. 
4. Overall fleet performance, especially MAR, tends to be worse under a priority response policy than under 
the other policies. 
Therefore, overall fleet performance may be maximised by employing the random or FIFO policy at the depot to 
satisfy base spare requests. By contrast, a need to guarantee sub-fleet performance at a specified base requires a 
priority depot response policy. It should be noted that in practice, the response policy may also depend on factors 
such as the nature of the missions at each base. 
  Summary and Conclusions  
A novel HCPN model of a fleet spare inventory system has been developed, considering a wide range of fleet 
factors including multiple operational bases, mission-oriented operation, three-level maintenance, preventive 
checks, opportunistic maintenance and cannibalisation. The multi-level model comprises modules, which can be 
instanced to represent repeatedly-used activities and facilities such as the operation and maintenance processes 
performed at different bases. This facilitates its modification and extension to study fleets with varying operation 
and maintenance factors. 
The application of the HCPN model is first demonstrated by studying an example fleet with a single operational 
base. The necessity of performing cannibalisation and opportunistic maintenance for the modelled fleet is 
analysed, as are the impacts of platform preventive inspections and spare inventories on fleet performance. The 
simulation results suggest that using cannibalisation, opportunistic maintenance and spares can help to improve 
fleet MCR and reduce the number of mission aborts, and the platform preventive inspection interval can have a 
significant impact on the performance of fleet maintenance and spare inventory system. Then a GA is applied to 
jointly optimise spare inventories and the inspection interval with the objective of minimising the total cost of 
spares and penalties related to mission aborts. The GA-based approach is demonstrated for a bounded horizon 
which contains a huge number of solutions, making exhaustive simulation impractical. The performance of the 
derived optimal solution found is verified through its comparison to a number of boundary scenarios. 
The HCPN model is further applied to a fleet of platforms that are deployed at two bases and served by a single 
depot in order to demonstrate its application to managing spare inventories for fleets with multiple operational 
bases. Two inventory management problems are studied: the allocation of spares to depot and base inventories 
and the discipline of how the depot responds to conflicting base spare requests. To provide a guide of how to use 
the HCPN model to solve these problems for practical fleets, a number of solutions are simulated and compared. 
Through comparisons, fleet managers can choose the best solution according to a specific management objective. 
These case studies demonstrate the capability of the HCPN model to help fleet managers design, manage and 
optimise fleet spare inventory and maintenance systems.  
Biographies   
Jingyu Sheng is a technical Major in the Chinese Air Force. He was awarded a PhD degree by the University of 
Nottingham in 2015, having focussed on modelling the maintenance of aircraft fleets. His research interests 
include complex system modelling, spare inventory and maintenance management, and multi-objective 
optimisation. 
Darren Prescott is Assistant Professor in Risk and Reliability Engineering in the Resilience Engineering Research 
Group at the University of Nottingham. His current research interests include aircraft fleet maintenance modelling, 
the application of reliability modelling techniques to support decision making in autonomous systems and the 
development of asset management models. He has published around 50 papers in the areas of risk, reliability and 
maintainability. He is chair of the ESRA (European Safety and Reliability Association) Technical Committee on 
Aeronautics and Aerospace. 
References  
1. Curtain, N.P., 2001. Military aircraft: cannibalizations adversely affect personnel and maintenance. 
Washington D.C.: United States General Accounting Office. 
2. Sherbrooke, C.C., 1966. Metric: a multi-echelon technique for recoverable item control. Santa Monica: The 
RAND Coporation. 
3. Muckstadt,  J., 1973. Model for a multi-item, multi-echelon, multi-indenture inventory system. Management 
Science, 20(4), pp.472-481. 
4. Slay, F.M., 1984. VARI-METRIC: an approach to modelling multi-echelon resupply when the demand 
process is poisson with a gamma prior. Washington: Logistics Management Institute. 
5. Sherbrooke, C.C., 1986. VARI-METRIC: Improved approximation for multi-indenture, multi-echelon 
availability models. Operations Research, 34(2), pp.311-319.  
6. Lau, H.C., Song, H., See, C.T. and Cheng, S.Y., 2006. Evaluation of time-varying availability in multi-
echelon spare parts systems with passivation. European Journal of Operational Research, 170(1), pp.91-105.  
7. Wang, N. and Ma, L., 2011. Estimation and analysis of time-varying availability under the drive of mission 
scenarios. In: IEEE, 9th International Conference on Reliability, Maintainability and Safety. Guiyang, China, 
12-15 June 2011. New York: IEEE.  
8. Hillestad, R.J., 1982. DYNA-METRIC: dynamic multi-indenture technique for recoverable item control. Santa 
Monica: The RAND Coporation.  
9. Isaacson, K.E. and Boren, P., 1988. Dyna-METRIC version 5: a capability assessment model including 
constrained repair and management adaptations. Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation. 
10. Marseguerra, M., Podofilini, L. and Zio, E., 2001. Use of genetic algorithm for the optimisation of spare parts 
inventory. In: Zio, E., 12th European Safety and Reliability Conference. Torino, Italy, 16-20 September 2001. 
Torini: Politecnico di Torino. 
11. Marseguerra, M., Zio, E. and Podofilini, L., 2005. Multiobjective spare part allocation by means of genetic 
algorithm and monte carlo simulation. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 87(3), pp.325-335. 
12. Ilgin, M. and Tunali, S., 2007. Joint optimisation of spare parts inventory and maintenace policies using 
genetic algorithm. International Journal of Advanced Manufacturing Technology, 34, pp.594-604. 
13. Chen, M., Hsu, C. and Chen, S., 2006. Optimising joint maintenance and stock provisioning policy for a 
multi-echelon spare part logistics network. Journal of the Chinese Institute of Industrial Engineers, 23(4), 
pp.289-302. 
14. Alrabgni, A. and Alabdulkarim, A., 2001. Simulation based optimisation of joint maintenance and inventory 
for multi-component manufacturing systems. In: Zio, E., 12th European Safety and Reliability Conference. 
Torino, Italy, 16-20 September 2001. Torini: Politecnico di Torino.  
15. Isaacson, K.E. and Boren, P., 1993. DYNA-METRIC Version 6: an advanced capability assesment model. 
Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation.  
16. Ormon, S.W. and Cassady, C.R., 2004. Cannibalization policies for a set of parallel machines. In: IEEE, 2004 
Annual Reliability and Maintainability Symposium. Los Angeles, USA, 26-29 Jananuary 2004. New York: 
IEEE. 
17. Salman, S., Cassady, C.R., Pohl, E.A. and Ormon, S.W., 2007. Evaluating the impact of cannibalization on 
fleet performance. Quality and Reliability Engineering International, 23(4), pp.445-457. 
18. Sheng, J. and Prescott, D.R., 2017. A hierarchical coloured petri net model of fleet maintenance with 
cannibalisation. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 168, pp.290-305. 
19. Volovoi, V., 2007. System-level maintenance policies via stochastic petri nets with aging tokens. In: IEEE, 
2007 Annual Reliability and Maintainability Symposium. Orlando, USA, 22-25 Jananuary 2007. New York: 
IEEE. 
20. Chew, S., Dunnett, S.J. and Andrews, J.D., 2008. Phased mission modelling of systems with maintenance free 
operating periods using simulated petri nets. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 93(7), pp.980-994. 
21. Jensen, K. and Kristensen, L.M., 2009. Coloured petri nets: modelling and validation of concurrent systems. 
Heidelberg: Springer. 
22. Raychaudhuri, S., 2008. Introduction to Monte Carlo simulation. In: Scott J.M., et al., 2008 Winter Simulation 
Conference. Miami, USA, 7-10 December 2008. New York: IEEE. 
23. Le, B., 2013. Modelling railway bridge asset management. PhD. University of Nottingham. 
24. Mitchell, M., 1999. An introduction to genetic algorithms. Cambridge: MIT Press.  
25. Murata, T., 1989. Petri nets: properties, analysis and applications. Proceedings of the IEEE, 77(4), pp.541-580. 
Appendix: Meaning of Places   
Place Meaning Colour Set Place Meaning 
Colour 
Set 
PDCMQ Depot component maintenance queue C PSSC Selected spare component C 
PBSCR Base spare component request C PPCA Cannibalised platforms that are not restored P 
PASC Assigned spare component AS PCSPR Failed components of the selected platform C 
PFMS Fleet missions M PPSID Primary spare installation decisions CRD 
PPCS Platform check state PCS PPCAD Primary component cannibalisation decisions CRD 
PCAA Cannibalisation policy - PPCF Finished platform checks P 
PPMC Mission-capable platforms  P PPFC Platforms which failed a check P 
PPNMC Non-mission-capable platforms P PCRQ Component removal queue C 
PCF Failed components C PMC Missing components in platforms C 
PPPM Platforms that are performing missions PM PRFC Removed, failed components C 
PPR Restored platforms P PRWC Removed, working components C 
PPMQ Platform maintenance queue P PIFCRQ I-level component repair queue C 
PPCQ Platform check queue P PFCTD Components that cannot be repaired at I-level C 
PE Event - PASCTB Spares assigned to a specific base C 
PAOM Opportunistic maintenance policy - PPUM Platforms undergoing maintenance P 
PCW Working components C PCAI 
Component cannibalisation inventory 
(working components that can be 
cannibalised) 
C 
PMGA Mission ground abort M PPWMQ Platform waiting maintenance queue P 
PMAA Mission air abort M PSPR Platform selected for restoration P 
PCCAQ 
Component cannibalisation queue 
(working components selected for 
cannibalisation) 
C 𝑃஼ோ௉ொ  
Component replacement queue 
(components to be replaced during 
maintenance) 
C 
PSCI Base spare inventories C PCPM PM due components C 
PCAN The number of cannibalisation performed C PSID Spare installation decision CRD 
PMS Mission starts M PCAD Cannibalisation decision CRD 
PPAM Platforms that are assigned to a mission PM PPPC Platforms that pass checks successfully P 
PPOG Platforms on ground P PICMQ I-level component maintenance queue C 
PMUA Mission under assignment M PIRC I-level repaired components C 
PME Missions end M PDCMQ Depot component maintenance queue C 
PPF Platform failures P    
 
